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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of discount rate heterogeneity for wealth inequality. The
key idea is to infer the distribution of preference parameters from the observed age pro￿le of
wealth inequality. The contribution of preference heterogeneity to wealth inequality can then
be measured using a quantitative life-cycle model.
I ￿nd that discount rate heterogeneity increases the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth by around 0.07
to levels that are close to the data. The share of wealth held by the richest 1% of households
rises by around 0.04, but falls short of the data by more than ten percentage points. Discount
rate heterogeneity also helps account for the large wealth inequality observed among households
with similar lifetime earnings.
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1 Introduction
A large literature studies wealth inequality in the context of quantitative life-cycle models. These
studies highlight the importance of earnings shocks, bequests, and entrepreneurship.1
A more recent branch of this literature suggests that preference heterogeneity may be an im-
portant source of wealth inequality. This is motivated by the ￿nding that observationally similar
households hold very di⁄erent amounts of wealth.2 For example, Venti and Wise (2000) study
wealth inequality at the outset of retirement among households with similar lifetime earnings and
conclude "that the bulk of the dispersion must be attributed to di⁄erences in the amount that
households choose to save" (p. 1).
Household survey data support the notion of preference heterogeneity. Empirical estimates of
consumption Euler equations indicate heterogeneity in time preferences (Lawrance 1991) and in risk
aversion coe¢ cients or intertemporal substitution elasticities (Vissing-Jorgenson 2002; Attanasio
and Browning 1995). Substantial heterogeneity is also found in survey data that are designed to
reveal households￿preference parameters (Barsky et al. 1997; Charles and Hurst 2003).
The potential importance of preference heterogeneity for wealth inequality is highlighted by
Krusell and Smith (1998). In their model, a "small" amount of discount rate heterogeneity leads
to large increases in wealth inequality (the Gini coe¢ cient increases by 0.57).
The objective of this paper is to measure the importance of preference heterogeneity for wealth
inequality.
￿For helpful comments I thank the editor, three anonymous referees, as well as seminar participants.
1Examples include Huggett (1996), Laitner (2002), Castenda et al. (2003), and De Nardi (2004).
2See Hurst et al. (1998), Venti and Wise (2000), Charles and Hurst (2003), Knowles and Postlewaite (2003).
1The approach. The main di¢ culty in addressing this issue is how preference parameters can be
inferred from data on consumption and saving behavior. The key idea of the paper is to exploit
that preference heterogeneity a⁄ects how wealth inequality changes with age.
To illustrate the intuition underlying this approach, consider a life-cycle model in which the
permanent income hypothesis holds and agents are identical except for their discount factors.
Patient households choose steeper age-consumption pro￿les and accumulate more retirement wealth
than do impatient households. As a result, wealth inequality, at least among the old, increases with
the dispersion of discount rates in a way that can be exploited to infer the distribution of preference
parameters.
Based on this idea, I measure the importance of preference heterogeneity for wealth inequality
as follows. Section 2 develops a quantitative life-cycle model of the kind that has been used
previously to study the wealth distribution. The model is based on Huggett￿ s (1996) benchmark
study and features ￿nitely lived households who are subject to uninsured earnings and mortality
risk. At birth, each household is endowed with a discount rate that depends stochastically on
parental preferences. Preferences are constant over an individual￿ s lifetime.3 The distribution of
discount rates is chosen to replicate how wealth inequality changes with age in U.S. data (section
3). Comparing the equilibria of models with and without preference heterogeneity o⁄ers a measure
of how much preference heterogeneity contributes to wealth inequality.
Findings. The main result, described in section 4, is that preference heterogeneity signi￿cantly
increases wealth inequality. The Gini coe¢ cient of wealth increases by around 0:07 to values that
are close to the data. The fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of households rises by around
0:04, but still falls more than 10 percentage points short of the data. Thus, preference heterogeneity
makes only a modest contribution towards accounting for the largest wealth observations, which
pose a challenge for many life-cycle models (see the discussion in Castaæeda et al. 2003). These
￿ndings are robust against alternative assumptions about bequest motives and the intergenerational
persistence of preferences.
My results di⁄er from those of Krusell and Smith (1998). In their model, small degrees of
discount rate heterogeneity imply very large changes in wealth inequality. Section 4.2 shows that
this discrepancy is due the amount of earnings risk faced by households. In Krusell and Smith￿ s
model, households do not retire and face only small, transitory shocks. By contrast, if households
face realistic amounts of earnings risk, even impatient households hold substantial precautionary
wealth. The wealth distribution is then far less sensitive to discount rate heterogeneity.
One challenge for existing life-cycle models, pointed out by Venti and Wise (2000) and Hendricks
(2006), is to account for the large degree of wealth dispersion among households with similar
lifetime earnings observed in U.S. data. Section 5 argues that preference heterogeneity substantially
improves the model￿ s ability to account for this observation. This ￿nding suggests that discount
rate heterogeneity may be an important determinant of savings behavior.
Literature. A number of previous studies have proposed quantitative models of inequality due to
preference heterogeneity. Krusell and Smith (1998) study an example with an arbitrary distribution
of discount rates. Samwick (1998) chooses the discount rate for each model agent to match one
wealth observation in the data. The contribution of this paper is to estimate the distribution of
preference parameters based on the observed age pro￿le of wealth inequality. Cagetti (2003) studies
precautionary saving in a model where preference parameters di⁄er between education groups. He
estimates preference parameters by matching the median age-wealth pro￿le for each group.
3Models of habit formation are an alternative with time varying preferences. Diaz et al. (2003) ￿nd that habit
formation implies only mild changes in the wealth distribution.
22 The Model
The economic environment is a version of the stochastic incomplete markets life-cycle model com-
monly used to study the wealth distribution (e.g., Huggett 1996). The economy is inhabited by a
continuum of households of unit mass, by a single representative ￿rm, and by a government. All
markets are competitive and the economy is in steady state.
2.1 Households
Demographics. A household lives for at most aD periods. Households work for the ￿rst aR
periods and then retire. Ps (a) denotes the probability of surviving from age a to a+1. Upon death,
a household is replaced by a child of age 1 who inherits the parent￿ s wealth. The child￿ s realizations
of preference parameters and labor endowments are correlated with the parent￿ s realizations.
Labor endowments. While of working age, households inelastically supply l = h(a) e units
of labor to the market, where h(a) is a deterministic age-e¢ ciency pro￿le. e denotes a labor
endowment shocks which is governed by the Markov transition matrix Pe. When the household
retires, he keeps his last labor endowment until death.
A new agent￿ s labor endowment (e1) depends stochastically on the parent￿ s e realization at age
aIG; it is governed by the Markov transition matrix Pe1. There are two reasons for deviating from
the more common assumption that e1 depends on the parent￿ s e at the age of death. First, the
transmission of human capital arguably occurs when the parent is middle aged, not at the time
of death. Secondly, the model cannot match the observed intergenerational persistence of lifetime
earnings, if labor endowments are transmitted too late in life (see Hendricks 2005 for details).
Preferences. At birth, a household is endowed with a discount factor ￿j which takes on J discrete
values. The household maximizes the expected discounted sum of period utilities over the lifetime





j u(ca) +  ￿^ aUc (1)
where ^ a is the realized age of death, c denotes consumption, and u(c) = c1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿). The
parameter   governs the strength of parental altruism. U and Uc are the parent￿ s and the child￿ s
indirect utility functions, which are de￿ned recursively by (1). The child￿ s preference draw is
governed by the transition matrix Pj (j;j0), which allows for the possibility of intergenerational
preference transmission.
Dynamic program. The problem solved by a household of type j may be written as a dynamic
program with state vector s = (a;k;e;j), where k is household wealth. The Bellman equation is
given by
V (s) = max
k0(s);c(s)
u(c(s)) + ￿j Ps(a)
P
e0 Pe (e;e0) V (s0)
+￿j (1 ￿ Ps (a)) W (k0 (s);s)
(2)
subject to the budget constraint
k0(s) = (1 + r)k(s) + wl(s) ￿ c(s) + ￿(a): (3)
and the borrowing constraint k(s0) ￿ 0. Here, r is the (constant) rate of return to capital, w is the
after-tax wage rate, and ￿ (a) is a lump-sum transfer which depends only on age.
When the parent dies, the child receives an inheritance of (1 ￿ ￿b) k0 (s), where ￿b is the estate
tax rate. W denotes the expected utility obtained from leaving a bequest, conditional on the














1;(1 ￿ ￿b)k0 (s);e1;j0￿
(4)
Pr(e1js) denotes the probability distribution over the child￿ s age 1 labor endowments, conditional
on the parent being in state s. This depends on the parent￿ s labor endowment at age aIG. To
reduce the parent￿ s state vector, I assume that the parent cannot recall his labor endowment
history. Pr(e1js) is therefore calculated in two steps. First, the parent computes the probability
distribution of e at age aIG, given s. Then the parent uses the transition matrix Pe1 to calculate
the distribution of e1, given e at age aIG.
2.2 Firms
Output is produced from capital (K) and labor (L) using a constant returns to scale production
function F (K;L). The representative ￿rm maximizes period pro￿ts, F(K;L)￿qK K ￿qL L, where
qK and qL denote the rental prices for capital and labor, respectively.
2.3 Government
The government taxes labor income at a proportional rate and provides lump-sum transfers to
retired households. The wage tax rate is ￿w, so that the after-tax wage rate is given by w =
(1 ￿ ￿w)qL. Denote the aggregate bequest ￿ ow by B. Bequest tax revenues then amount to ￿bB.
Transfers ￿ (a) consist of two components. Retired households (a > aR) receive a ￿xed transfer
of ￿R. In addition, all households receive a common transfer of ￿ ￿. Aggregate transfer payments
amount to X =
R
￿(s)￿ (s) ds, where ￿(s) denotes the density of households over states. The
di⁄erence between tax revenues and transfer spending is used for government consumption (CG).
The government budget constraint is therefore
CG + X = ￿w qL L + ￿bB: (5)
2.4 Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium consists of aggregate quantities (K;L;C;X;B), a price sys-
tem (w;r;qK;qL), lump-sum transfers (￿ ￿) a value function (V [s]), a policy function (c[s]), and a
distribution over household types, ￿(s), such that:
￿ The policy functions and the value function solve the household problem.
￿ Firms maximize pro￿ts.
￿ Markets clear.
￿ The government budget is balanced.
￿ The distribution of household types, ￿(s), is stationary.
￿ Household prices are given by w = (1 ￿ ￿w)qL and r = qK ￿ ￿.
The market clearing conditions are K =
R
￿(s)k(s)ds for capital, L =
R
￿(s)l(s)ds for labor,
and F(K;L)￿￿ K = C+CG for goods, where ￿ is the rate of depreciation. Aggregate consumption
is given by C =
R
￿(s)c(s)ds. The aggregate bequest ￿ ow, B, equals the savings of all households
who die in the current period.
42.5 Discussion
The solution algorithm is described in the appendix. It searches over transition matrices for pref-
erence parameters (Pj) until the model replicates the calibration targets explained below. For each
candidate Pj the stationary equilibrium is computed. This involves solving a ￿xed point problem
in the household value function for each type j. This computational complexity forces the model to
abstract from a number of potentially interesting features. In particular: (i) Retirement transfers
could depend on the households￿income histories. (ii) Generations could overlap and inheritances
might be received at middle age rather than at the beginning of life. One bene￿t of abstracting from
these features is that the model is similar to the well-understood benchmark studied by Huggett
(1996).
Preference heterogeneity takes the simplest possible form. Households are endowed with pref-
erence parameters that remain ￿xed over the entire lifespan and are uncorrelated with labor en-
dowments. These assumptions are common in the literature (e.g., Samwick 1998; Guvenen 2005).
Krusell and Smith (1998) model preferences as following a Markov chain, but interpret their model
as approximating a life-cycle model with age invariant preferences for individuals.
3 Model Parameters
This section describes how the model parameters are chosen. Since the literature has not reached
a consensus about the motives for leaving bequests, I study three versions of the model:
1. In the no bequest model the government con￿scates all bequests: ￿b = 1.
2. In the accidental bequest model households are sel￿sh (  = 0) but may leave bequests acci-
dentally (￿b = 0).
3. In the altruistic model parents care about their children (  = 1) and bequests are not taxed
(￿b = 0).4
Most parameter values are common to all models; these are summarized in table 1. The model
speci￿c parameters are the transition matrix Pj, the discount factors ￿j, and the lump-sum transfer
￿ ￿.
Demographics. The model period is one year. Households are thought to enter the model at
age 22 and live at most until age 90 (aD = 69). Retirement occurs at age 64 (aR = 43). Mortality
rates are taken from the 1997 Social Security Life Tables.
Labor endowments. The mean age-productivity pro￿le h(a) is estimated from 1990 PUMS
data. The transition matrix for transitory labor endowments, Pe, approximates an autoregressive
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on a 7 point grid. Processes of this type are commonly estimated in the
literature. New agents inherit labor endowments from their parents at parental age 40 (aIG = 19)
according to an autoregressive process of the form
ln(e1) = ￿c ln(eaIG) + "c (7)
with "c ￿ N(0;￿2






are chosen to match two sets of targets. The
￿rst set consists of the standard deviations of log earnings at ages between 22 and 58 reported by
4A model with weaker altruism (  = 0:5) has similar implications, except for the size of aggregate bequests.
5Table 1: Model parameters
Demographics
aD = 69 Maximum lifetime (physical age 90)
aR = 43 Retirement age (physical age 64)
Ps Matches mortality rates of couples. Social Security Adminis-
tration, Period Life Tables 1997
Labor endowments
ne = 7 Size of labor endowment grid
￿ = 0:998 Persistence of labor endowments
Std(￿) = 0:166 Standard deviation of transitory shocks
￿c = 0:409 Intergenerational persistence of labor endowments
Std(ec) = 0:049 Standard deviation of age 1 endowment shock
aIG = 19 Age of intergenerational transmission (physical age 40)
Preferences
￿ = 1:5 Huggett (1996)
Technology
￿ = 0:36 Capital income share in NIPA
￿ = 0:076 Matches after-tax interest rate of 4 percent
A = 0:89 Normalized such that qL = 1
Government
CG=Y = 0:20 Castaneda et al. (2003)
￿w = 0:40 Trostel (1993)
￿R = 0:75 Replacement rate of 0.4
Notes: The table shows parameters that are common to all models and experiments. The choice
of preference parameters is explained in the text.
Storesletten et al. (2004, ￿gure 3). The variance of i.i.d. shocks (0.063) is subtracted because the
model does not have such shocks. The second set of targets is the intergenerational persistence of
the discounted present value of earnings over the work life. This coe¢ cient is commonly estimated
by regressing the logarithm of sons￿lifetime earnings on the logarithm of fathers￿lifetime earnings.
Based on the literature surveyed by Solon (1999), I choose a target coe¢ cient of 0:4.
Preferences. The utility function is iso-elastic: u(c) = c1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿). The curvature parameter
is set to the conventional value of ￿ = 1:5. For the strength of the altruistic bequest motive I
consider two cases: sel￿sh parents (  = 0) and parents who value the utility of their o⁄spring as
much as their own (  = 1). For models with homogenous preferences, the discount factor ￿ is
chosen to match a capital-output ratio of 3:1.
Technology. The production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form: F (K;L) = A K￿ L1￿￿.
The capital share parameter is set to the conventional value of 0:36. The parameters A and ￿ are
chosen such that the equilibrium factor prices are qL = 1 and r = 0:04.
Government. The wage tax rate is set to ￿w = 0:4 following Trostel (1993). Government
spending is set to 20.2% of output (Castaæeda et al., 2003). Retirement transfers amount to 40% of
mean after-tax earnings per working household (De Nardi 2004). For the estate tax rate I consider
the values ￿b = 0 and ￿b = 1. Lump sum transfers (￿ ￿) balance the budget.
Since the data used to parameterize the model are taken from samples that fail to oversample
the rich, the model economy should be thought of as representing the lower 99% of the earnings
6and wealth distribution (see Juster et al. 1999).
3.1 The Distribution of Discount Rates
The paper considers alternative approaches to estimating the distribution of discount rates. I




and a set of
calibration targets that the transition matrix Pj is chosen to attain. The main idea of the paper
is to estimate the distribution of discount rates from the age pro￿le of wealth inequality. This
experiment is labeled WA.
For computational reasons, it is necessary to assume that ￿j lies on a grid:
￿j = ￿ ￿ ￿ (0:94;0:98;1;1:02;1:06) (8)
￿ ￿ is set to the discount factor in the corresponding model without homogeneous preferences, so that
the algorithm can choose very small amounts of heterogeneity. At the same time, the gap between
the most patient and the least patient preference class is more than twice the gap estimated by
Lawrance (1991). The transition matrix Pj is chosen jointly with lump-sum transfers ￿ ￿ to minimize































The loss function contains three terms. (i) The deviation from the observed capital-output ratio.
(ii) The government budget de￿cit (D) scaled by output. (iii) The deviation from the observed age
pro￿le of wealth inequality. This is measured as the average absolute deviation between the Gini
coe¢ cients of wealth at age a in the model versus the data. The weights used in the loss function
ensure that the model￿ s capital-output ratio is close to the data.
To reduce the number of calibrated parameters, a simple form of intergenerational preference
persistence is imposed. With probability pIG = 0:5 the child inherits the parent￿ s value of ￿j.
Otherwise, the child draws ￿j with probability !j. The sensitivity analysis explores alternative
values of pIG. Table 2 shows the stationary distribution of preference parameters for each bequest
motive. Table 3 shows the values for ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿ for each model and the equilibrium values of the
capital-output ratio and of aggregate bequests.
Table 2: Stationary distribution of discount factors. Experiment WA
￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿4 ￿5 Avg. ￿
No bequests 43.1 8.1 19.9 18.4 10.5 0.952
Accidental bequ. 43.8 0.0 12.3 43.8 0.0 0.945
Altruism 13.1 0.1 82.5 4.2 0.1 0.937
Notes: The table shows the fraction of households endowed with each level of ￿j. Avg. ￿ is the
mean discount factor across all households.
3.2 The Age Pro￿le of Wealth Inequality: Data
This section describes how the age pro￿le of the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth is estimated. In cross-
sectional data, the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth are highest for households in their twenties and roughly
￿ at between the ages of 30 and 65 (D￿az-GimØnez et al. 1997; Budria et al. 2002). However, to
be comparable with the model economies, the data should be drawn from a source that does not
oversample the rich, such as the PSID. Moreover, cohort e⁄ects need to be removed to isolate the
changes in inequality as cohorts age.
7Table 3: Steady state statistics. Experiment WA
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ K=Y B=Y [%] D=Y [%]
PSID - - 3.10 2.65 0.0
No bequests 0.969 0.02 3.11 2.44 -0.0
- No ￿ hetero 0.969 0.01 3.10 2.21 0.0
Accidental bequ. 0.961 -0.07 3.11 1.95 0.0
- No ￿ hetero 0.961 -0.06 3.12 1.88 0.2
Altruism 0.944 -0.06 3.13 4.07 -0.0
- No ￿ hetero 0.944 -0.06 3.10 3.91 0.0
Notes: The table shows the model speci￿c parameters and steady state properties. D denotes the
government budget de￿cit.
Since estimates of this kind have not appeared in the literature, I construct new estimates based
on the 1968 to 1999 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). My measure of wealth is
the variable WEALTH2 from the PSID￿ s wealth supplement. It includes ￿nancial assets, durables,
and real estate net of any debts. It does not include pension wealth. Wealth is observed in 1984,
1989, 1994, and 1999.
Households are divided into ￿ve-year cohorts according to the birth year of the household head.
For each cohort-year cell containing at least 50 observations, I calculate the Gini coe¢ cient of
wealth. Figure 1 plots these Gini coe¢ cients against the mean age of the head in each cell. Gini
coe¢ cients clearly fall with age from near 0.9 around age 25 to 0.6 around age 65.
To disentangle age and cohort e⁄ects, I regress each cell￿ s Gini coe¢ cient on age, age2, and
on cohort dummies. The solid line in ￿gure 1 shows the predicted age-Gini pro￿le for the default
cohort born in 1936 (who retires near the end of the wealth data). Wealth inequality declines as
cohorts age. The Gini coe¢ cients drop from 0.87 at age 25 to 0.65 at age 60 and level o⁄thereafter.
In what follows, I take these predicted Gini coe¢ cients as representing the data. My ￿ndings are
consistent with Menchik and Jianakoplos (1993) who estimate age e⁄ects for households in the
National Longitudinal Surveys starting at age 45.
3.3 The Age Pro￿le of Wealth Inequality: Model
Figure 2 shows the age pro￿les of wealth inequality implied by the model economies. Each panel
shows three lines representing the model with and without discount rate heterogeneity and empirical
estimates based on PSID data.
Consider ￿rst the models without intended bequests in panels (a) and (b). With homogeneous
preferences the ￿ndings resemble those of Huggett (1996). Wealth inequality is too high among the
young and too low among the middle aged and the old. In the no bequest model, wealth inequality
is very high among the young because all agents start life without assets. Since age earnings pro￿les
are initially rising with age, only those receiving very good labor endowment shocks save positive
amounts. Therefore, among the young very few agents hold positive wealth.
Accidental bequests reduce wealth inequality among the very young, re￿ ecting the distribution
of inheritances. Wealth inequality rises early in life as some households consume their inheritances
while others do not because they receive positive earnings shocks. As households age, the retirement
saving motive takes over, most households accumulate wealth, and the Gini coe¢ cients decline
(Gourinchas and Parker 2002). In sum, the no bequest model and the accidental bequest model
imply too much wealth inequality among the young and too little wealth inequality after middle
age.
Preference heterogeneity increases inequality, especially among the middle aged. It therefore
























Figure 1: Gini coe¢ cients of wealth by age. PSID data.
helps the model to match the data. Especially the no bequest model then comes quite close to
matching the observed age pro￿le of Gini coe¢ cients.
With homogenous preferences, the altruism model resembles the accidental bequest model.
Discount rate heterogeneity increases wealth inequality at all ages. This widens the gap between
the model and the data before age 40. As a result, the calibration algorithm chooses a relatively
small amount of heterogeneity for the altruistic model (see table 2).
To see the intuition underlying ￿gure 2, consider a deterministic version of the model in which






￿￿ = ￿j R: (10)
Among households with identical discount rates, age consumption pro￿les are parallel and
proportional to lifetime incomes. The factor of proportionality depends only on age and on the
preference type (j). Since retirement wealth ￿nances retirement consumption (abstracting from
government transfers), retirement wealth is also proportional to lifetime income. The ratio of re-
tirement wealth to lifetime income only depends on j and is higher for more patient households.
As a result, preference heterogeneity increases wealth inequality among households in or close to
retirement. Among young households, the bu⁄er stock motive dominates saving decisions (Gour-
inchas and Parker 2002). Preference heterogeneity then a⁄ects wealth inequality mainly through
the distribution of inheritances.6
It may appear at ￿rst that the model should be able to match the age pro￿le of wealth inequality
exactly, at least if the preference grid is ￿ne enough. The altruism model illustrates why this is
not the case. It implies cross-age restrictions which limit the wealth distributions the model can
5The working paper version of Charles and Hurst (2003) works out such a model
6The Euler equation (10) suggests and alternative estimation approach which exploits that discount rates determine
the age pro￿le of consumption inequality. However, consumption inequality is not strongly a⁄ected by preference
heterogeneity, except for households near retirement. Estimating preference parameters from the age pro￿le of
consumption inequality would therefore provide only weak identi￿cation.










































Figure 2: Age pro￿le of wealth Gini coe¢ cients. Experiment WA.
generate. Since preference heterogeneity increases inequality among young and old households, it
is not possible to match inequality among the old without overstating inequality among the young.
4 Findings
This section presents the main ￿ndings. For each model economy, I compute equilibria with and
without discount rate heterogeneity. Comparing the implied wealth distributions yields a measure
of the contribution of preference heterogeneity to wealth inequality.
The e⁄ect of preference heterogeneity on the wealth distribution is shown in table 4. For each
model economy the table shows points on the Lorenz curve of wealth as well as the Gini coe¢ cient.
For comparison, the table also shows PSID data taken from Hendricks (2006) and 1998 Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) data taken from Budria et al. (2002). The statistics characterizing the
PSID data are familiar from the literature. The richest 1% of households hold one quarter of total
wealth. The Gini coe¢ cient of 0:76 is smaller than the one obtained from the SCF. This re￿ ects
the fact that the PSID fails to over-sample rich households (Juster et al. 1999).7
With homogeneous preferences, the no bequest model essentially reproduces the ￿ndings of
7Wealth observations are taken from the PSID because a longitudinal dataset is required to estimate the age
pro￿le of wealth inequality in section 3.2.
10Huggett (1996). The Gini coe¢ cient of 0:68 is somewhat smaller than in the data. The fraction of
wealth held by the richest 1% of households is only 10%, compared with 25% in the PSID. Previous
studies have shown that life-cycle models have di¢ culties accounting for the large wealth holdings
of the richest households in SCF data.8 It is interesting to note that the same di¢ culty arises with
PSID data, even though the PSID fails to over sample the rich.
Neither accidental nor altruistic bequests change the wealth distribution much. Bequests change
the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth by 0:02 and slightly reduce the fraction of wealth held by the richest
1% of households.9
Table 4: Wealth distribution. Experiment WA.
1 1-5 5-10 10-20 20-40 40-60 60-100 Gini
PSID 25.3 21.8 14.0 16.3 15.8 6.0 0.9 0.76
SCF 34.7 23.1 11.3 12.7 12.2 5.0 1.0 0.80
No bequests 14.1 26.5 18.7 21.0 16.2 3.3 0.2 0.77
- No ￿ hetero 10.1 22.5 16.4 20.5 20.3 8.0 2.3 0.68
Accidental bequ. 11.8 24.7 18.1 21.5 18.7 4.7 0.4 0.74
- No ￿ hetero 9.3 21.5 16.5 20.6 20.9 8.6 2.7 0.66
Altruism 14.0 23.8 17.6 20.4 17.8 5.5 0.9 0.74
- No ￿ hetero 9.3 22.5 17.6 21.3 20.2 7.3 1.9 0.69
Notes: The table shows the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth and the fraction of wealth held by various
percentile groups of households. The distribution of discount rates is estimated from the age
pro￿le of wealth inequality. SCF data are taken from Budria et al. (2002).
The e⁄ects of preference heterogeneity on the wealth distribution are broadly similar for all
bequest motives. With homogeneous preferences, the poorest 60% of model households hold too
much wealth, whereas the richest 1% hold too little. Discount rate heterogeneity improves both
margins. As a result, the Gini coe¢ cients rise by 0:05 to 0:09 and reach levels that are close to the
PSID.
Even though the fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of households increases, it falls short
of the data by more than ten percentage points. Thus, discount rate heterogeneity makes only
a modest contribution towards accounting for the largest wealth holdings. The model economies
match the observed Gini coe¢ cients by overstating the wealth held by wealth rich households
outside the top percentile. Households in the 5th to 20th percentile hold 30% of total wealth in the
data, compared with up to 40% in the model.
4.1 Robustness
It is di¢ cult to ￿nd compelling evidence about the intergenerational persistence of preferences (pIG)
and about the strength of the bequest motive ( ). Table 5 explores how the interaction of pIG
and   a⁄ects the results reported previously. Panel (a) shows the changes in the Gini coe¢ cient
of wealth due to discount rate heterogeneity. Panel (b) shows the corresponding changes in the
fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of households. Each row corresponds to one bequest
motive. The columns vary pIG between 0 and 0.9. Note that pIG = 0:9 implies an extreme degree
of persistence: families typically remain in the same preference state for several hundred years.
Overall, the qualitative conclusions of table 4 appear robust. The exception is the case of
altruism and strong preference persistence.
8Castaæeda et al. (2003) discuss this problem and o⁄er a candidate solution.
9Whether bequests increase or reduce wealth inequality is debated in the literature (e.g., Gokhale et al. 2001;
Laitner 2002; De Nardi 2004).
11Table 5: Bequests and intergenerational preference persistence. Experiment WA.
(a) Changes in the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth.
pIG = 0:0 pIG = 0:5 pIG = 0:9
No bequests 0.093 0.093 0.093
Accidental bequ. 0.078 0.078 0.075
Altruism 0.049 0.047 0.028
(b) Changes in the shares of wealth held by the richest 1% of households.
pIG = 0:0 pIG = 0:5 pIG = 0:9
No bequests 0.040 0.040 0.040
Accidental bequ. 0.030 0.025 0.024
Altruism 0.020 0.047 0.071
Notes: The table shows the e⁄ects of varying the intergenerational persistence of preferences
(pIG) and bequest motives. Panel (a) shows the changes in the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth due to
discount rate heterogeneity. Panel (b) shows the changes in the fractions of wealth held by the
richest 1% of households. Each entry is the di⁄erence between the models with heterogeneous and
homogeneous preferences.
Setting aside this case, table 5 shows that varying pIG has little e⁄ect on the changes in the
wealth distribution. Larger bequests generally dampen the changes in the Gini coe¢ cients. How-
ever, the models￿Gini coe¢ cients (between 0:74 and 0:77) are always close to the PSID￿ s value of
0:76. The fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of households changes between 2:4% to 4:7%.
In all cases, it falls short of the observed value by more than ten percentage points.
In the case of altruism and strong preference persistence the calibration algorithm chooses a
very small amount of discount rate heterogeneity. In steady state, 99:1% of households are in the
same preference state. As a result, the change in wealth inequality is smaller than in the other
cases. Nonetheless, the fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of households increases by 7%.
The intuition is that families can acquire large amounts of wealth by accumulating large estates
over several generations. This happens if parents wish to leave large bequests (they are patient
and altruistic) and if a family contains several consecutive generations of patient individuals (pIG
is large enough).
This intuition suggests that stronger preference persistence and larger bequests should always
magnify the changes in the wealth distribution. Yet table 5 shows that this is not the case. The
intuition fails because the estimated dispersion of discount rates is smaller for high values of pIG
or  .
For a given distribution of preferences, the e⁄ect of discount rate heterogeneity on wealth
inequality is indeed stronger when pIG and   are high. However, these cases also imply large wealth
dispersion among middle aged and older households. This can be seen by comparing alternative
bequest motives with homogeneous preferences in ￿gure 2. The calibration algorithm therefore
chooses less discount rate heterogeneity (see table 2). The total e⁄ect of preference heterogeneity
on wealth inequality may therefore be larger or smaller when pIG and   are high.
To summarize: Discount rate heterogeneity improves the life-cycle model￿ s ability to account
for the observed distribution of wealth. It increases the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth by around 0:07
to values that are close to the PSID. It also raises the fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of
households, albeit not by enough to account for the largest wealth holdings observed in the data.
These ￿ndings are robust against variations in the strength of altruism and in the intergenerational
persistence of preferences.
124.2 Comparison With Krusell and Smith (1998)
A well-known previous study of the interaction between discount rate heterogeneity and wealth
inequality is due to Krusell and Smith (1998; hereafter KS). Their ￿ndings are strikingly di⁄erent
from mine. In KS, a "small" amount of preference heterogeneity increases the Gini coe¢ cient of
wealth from 0.25 to 0.82. Relative to KS, my experiment WA implies much more heterogeneity in
discount rates but yields a much smaller increase in wealth inequality.
This section argues that the di⁄erence stems from the amount of risk faced by the model agents.
In KS, households face earnings shocks that are either very small or transitory. This renders the
wealth distribution sensitive to discount rate heterogeneity. By contrast, households in my model
face the large and persistent shocks commonly estimated from individual earnings data. Larger
shocks imply that the wealth distribution is less sensitive to discount rate heterogeneity.
The experiment. To demonstrate this claim, I construct two experiments that approximate
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The value of p2 is chosen such that, in the stationary distribution, 80% of households are in state
j = 2: Krusell and Smith set p1 such that the average duration of a preference state is 50 years
(one generation). This cannot be replicated in a life-cycle model. I therefore set p1 = 0:5 to allow
for some intergenerational preference persistence. The ￿ndings are not sensitive to this choice. As
in KS, parents are altruistic towards their children. ￿ ￿ is chosen to match a capital-output ratio
of 3.1. For simplicity, I set ￿ ￿ = 0 and adjust government consumption to balance the budget. All
other parameters are determined as described in section 3.
The two experiments di⁄er only in their labor endowment processes. The ￿rst experiment,
KS1, imposes the process described in section 3. The second experiment, KS2, assumes a low risk
process which approximates KS￿ s unemployment shocks. The labor endowment equals one with
probability 0:93 and 0:5 with probability 0:07.10 In addition, retirement saving is eliminated from
the model by imposing a ￿ at age labor-endowment pro￿le h(a). This is consistent with KS, where
households are in￿nitely lived. To measure the role of preference heterogeneity, I compute each
model economy under homogeneous and heterogeneous discount rates. Except for the values of ￿ ￿,
the economies share the same parameters.
Results. The ￿ndings are shown in table 6. For experiment KS1, discount rate heterogeneity has
a negligible e⁄ect on the wealth distribution. The Lorenz curve of wealth is nearly unchanged. The
Gini coe¢ cient of wealth increases by less than 0:01, compared with 0:57 in KS.
By contrast, in experiment KS2 discount rate heterogeneity dramatically increases wealth in-
equality. The Gini coe¢ cient rises by 0:22 and the fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of
households increases by 0:09. The change in wealth inequality is larger than in experiment WA,
even though the degree of preference heterogeneity is an order of magnitude smaller.
Intuition. Comparing experiments KS1 and KS2 reveals that a low-risk labor endowment process
renders the wealth distribution sensitive to discount rate heterogeneity. The intuition is as follows.
In KS￿ s model (and in experiment KS2), households hold very little precautionary wealth (see
KS￿ s table 2). Moreover, households do not save for retirement. With homogeneous preferences,
the steady state interest rate is therefore close to the discount rate (￿R is close to 1).
10Because the model period in KS￿ s model is shorter, even i.i.d. shocks are more persistent than KS￿ s unemployment
shocks.
13Table 6: Wealth distribution. Experiment KS2.
1 1-5 5-10 10-20 20-40 40-60 60-100 Gini
PSID 25.3 21.8 14.0 16.3 15.8 6.0 0.9 0.76
KS1 9.3 22.5 17.6 21.3 20.1 7.2 1.8 0.69
- No ￿ hetero 9.3 22.5 17.6 21.3 20.2 7.3 1.9 0.69
KS2 14.1 21.3 15.3 18.9 19.1 7.4 4.0 0.67
- No ￿ hetero 5.2 13.1 12.1 18.2 24.4 15.0 12.0 0.45
Notes: See table 4
As explained by Carroll (1997), household saving behavior di⁄ers fundamentally depending
on whether households are patient (￿R > 1) or impatient (￿R < 1). When ￿R < 1, households
behave as bu⁄er stock savers, who only accumulate small bu⁄er stocks of wealth in order to self-
insure against shocks. By contrast, when ￿R > 1, households wish to accumulate unbounded
amounts of wealth.
This explains why small amounts of discount rate heterogeneity imply large changes in the
wealth distribution. When ￿R is only slightly below 1, a small amount of preference heterogeneity
qualitatively changes the saving behavior of the most patient households from bu⁄er stock saving
to unbounded saving. As a result, these household accumulate large amounts of wealth relative to
the less patient bu⁄er stock savers.
In experiment KS1, households face more earnings uncertainty and hold larger bu⁄er stocks.
In addition, even impatient households save for retirement. As a result, the steady state interest
rate is substantially smaller than the average discount rate. With a small amount of discount rate
heterogeneity, even the most patient households remain bu⁄er stock savers. More patient agents
hold larger bu⁄er stocks (and more retirement wealth) than the less patient ones. However, in
contrast to KS, they do not accumulate very large amounts of wealth over the course of several
generations.
Moreover, even if a larger amount of preference heterogeneity turns the most patient households
into unbounded savers, the e⁄ect on the wealth distribution is smaller than in KS￿ s case. The reason
is that, in experiment KS1, impatient households hold substantial wealth in order to self-insure
against retirement and earnings shocks.
4.3 Replicating the cross-sectional wealth distribution
The previous section showed that discount rate heterogeneity helps account for the observed Gini
coe¢ cient of wealth, but makes only a modest contribution towards accounting for the wealth
holdings of the richest 1% of households. This section explores how well the model can replicate
the wealth distribution when the distribution of discount rates is estimated di⁄erently.
Experiment WD addresses this question by choosing the distribution of discount rates to match
points on the Lorenz curve for wealth. It di⁄ers from experiment WA only in the loss function








































The ￿rst two terms are the same as in experiment WA. The third term is the deviation from the
overall Gini coe¢ cient of wealth. The ￿nal term represents the average absolute deviation from
points on the Lorenz curve for wealth. CFp denotes the fraction of wealth held by the poorest p
percent of households in the model. CFD
p is the data counterpart of CFp. The percentiles p are
14the ones shown in table 4. The stationary distributions of preference parameters that minimize the
loss function are shown in table 7.
Table 7: Stationary distribution of discount factors. Experiment WD.
￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿4 ￿5 Avg. ￿
No bequests 0.0 70.5 17.6 0.0 11.9 0.962
Accidental bequ. 0.0 60.4 33.0 0.1 6.5 0.953
Altruism 0.1 65.9 17.0 17.1 0.0 0.935
Notes: See table 2. Preference parameters are estimated from the Lorenz curve for wealth.
Results. The ￿ndings are shown in tables 8 and 9. For the case of intermediate preference
persistence (pIG = 0:5), table 8 compares the wealth distributions with homogeneous and with
heterogeneous preferences. Table 9 shows how the changes in the wealth distribution vary with the
bequest motive and with intergenerational preference persistence.
Table 8: Wealth distribution. Experiment WD.
1 1-5 5-10 10-20 20-40 40-60 60-100 Gini
PSID 25.3 21.8 14.0 16.3 15.8 6.0 0.9 0.76
No bequests 13.8 25.6 18.3 20.4 16.6 4.7 0.6 0.75
- No ￿ hetero 10.1 22.5 16.4 20.5 20.3 8.0 2.3 0.68
Accidental bequ. 16.7 25.2 17.0 18.9 16.1 5.1 0.9 0.75
- No ￿ hetero 9.3 21.5 16.5 20.6 20.9 8.6 2.7 0.66
Altruism 15.0 27.8 18.7 19.7 14.6 3.6 0.5 0.78
- No ￿ hetero 9.3 22.5 17.6 21.3 20.2 7.3 1.9 0.69
Notes: See table 4. Preference parameters are estimated from the Lorenz curve for wealth.
Table 9: Bequests and intergenerational preference persistence. Experiment WD.
(a) Changes in the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth.
pIG = 0:0 pIG = 0:5 pIG = 0:9
No bequests 0.074 0.074 0.074
Accidental bequ. 0.090 0.090 0.092
Altruism 0.081 0.088 0.072
(b) Changes in the shares of wealth held by the richest 1% of households.
pIG = 0:0 pIG = 0:5 pIG = 0:9
No bequests 0.037 0.037 0.037
Accidental bequ. 0.053 0.074 0.087
Altruism 0.067 0.058 0.140
Notes: See table 5.
With one exception, the results are broadly similar to experiment WA, where the distribution
of discount rates was chosen to match wealth inequality by age. Preference heterogeneity increases
the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth by around 0:08 to levels which are close to the data. These changes are
not sensitive to pIG. The fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of households rises between 0:04
and 0:09. The magnitudes of these changes are similar to experiment WA. The models again fall
short of replicating the largest wealth holdings found in the data. They still come close to matching
the observed Gini coe¢ cient because the wealth holdings of the richest households outside the top
percentile are overstated.
15The exception is the case of altruism and strong preference persistence (pIG = 0:9). In this
case, the model comes close to replicating the empirical wealth distribution. The fraction of wealth
held by top 1% is only 3% smaller than in the PSID. The shares of wealth held by the other wealth
percentiles shown in table 8 are within 2% of data.
However, in this case the model has other implications that are at variance with the data.
Aggregate bequests are likely larger than in the data. They amount to 3% of output, compared
with 1.7% in the PSID.11. Intergenerational wealth persistence is stronger than most empirical
estimates suggest. Regressing the logarithm of sons￿wealth on that of fathers￿wealth typically
yields estimates between 0:4 and 0:5 (see the surveys by Mulligan 1997 and Solon 1999). In the
model, the corresponding regression coe¢ cients are above 0:6. Finally, the model overstates wealth
inequality within age groups.
In sum, the ￿ndings support the conclusions of experiment WA: discount rate heterogeneity
makes a signi￿cant contributions to wealth inequality, but only a moderate conclusion towards
accounting for the largest wealth holdings observed in the data. Some readers have asked why
the model cannot replicate the observed wealth distribution exactly. For each wealth observation
in the data, it should be possible to construct a model household (choose a ￿) who holds exactly
the right amount of wealth. Samwick (1998) uses this approach. However, this procedure fails to
ensure that the distribution of preference parameters is age invariant. The model implies cross-age
restrictions that limit the set of wealth distributions it can generate, even if age invariance is the
only restriction placed on the distribution of discount factors.
5 Wealth and Lifetime Earnings
In U.S. data, observationally similar households often hold very di⁄erent amounts of wealth.12
Hendricks (2006) shows that this poses a challenge for life-cycle models. Such models imply a
tight relationship between wealth and lifetime earnings which is not observed in the data. This
section shows that discount rate heterogeneity substantially improves the life-cycle model￿ s ability
to account for the joint distribution of lifetime earnings and wealth.
Data. The empirical characterization of the relationship between earnings and wealth is taken
from Hendricks (2006). The data are drawn from the 1968-2003 waves of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). To be included in the sample, wealth must be observed when the household head
is near age 65 and household earnings must be observed for at least 15 years prior to retirement
(see Hendricks 2006 for details). Studying households at the outset of retirement has two bene￿ts:
(i) Past earnings can be summarized by lifetime earnings. (ii) Wealth holdings are not a⁄ected by
expectations about future earnings growth. Lifetime earnings (E) are de￿ned as the discounted
present value of household earnings up to age 65. Retirement wealth (W) is household net worth
at age 65. The retirement saving rate is de￿ned as s = W=E.
Hendricks (2006) highlights three features of the data that pose challenges for life-cycle models.
These are summarized in the ￿rst row of table 10:
1. The correlation between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings (CWE) is near 0.6. Life-cycle
models tend to imply stronger correlations around 0.9.
2. There is substantial wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings. To
measure this, households are divided into lifetime earnings deciles. Denote by Ginij the Gini
coe¢ cient of retirement wealth within decile j. The mean of Ginij across deciles in the PSID
is 0:54. This is not dramatically lower than the Gini coe¢ cient of retirement wealth in the
11This estimate is taken from Hendricks (2006) and does not include inter-vivos transfers.
12See Gustman and Juster (1996), Hurst et al. (1998), Venti and Wise (2000) and the references therein.
16entire sample of 0:62. Venti and Wise (2000) document a similar ￿nding in the Health and
Retirement Study.
3. Earnings rich households save only slightly more for retirement than do earnings poor house-
holds. The retirement saving rate di⁄ers by only two percentage points between the tenth
and the ￿rst lifetime earnings decile (￿s = 0:02).
Table 10: Retirement wealth and lifetime earnings. Experiment WA.
CWE Gini ￿s
PSID 0.61 0.54 0.02
No bequests 0.65 0.58 0.11
- No ￿ hetero 0.95 0.26 0.16
Accidental bequ. 0.70 0.54 0.11
- No ￿ hetero 0.93 0.33 0.14
Altruism 0.71 0.50 0.12
- No ￿ hetero 0.92 0.39 0.14
Notes: The table shows summary statistics characterizing the joint distribution of retirement
wealth and lifetime earnings. CWE is the correlation between retirement wealth and lifetime
earnings. Gini denotes the average Gini coe¢ cient of retirement wealth within lifetime earnings
deciles. ￿s measures the di⁄erence in the retirement saving rate between the tenth and the ￿rst
lifetime earnings decile.
Homogeneous preferences. Table 10 con￿rms the ￿ndings of Hendricks (2006): life-cycle mod-
els with homogeneous preferences have di¢ culties accounting for the joint distribution of W and
E. The models shown are those of experiment WA with pIG = 0:5. The distribution of discount
rates is estimated from the age pro￿le of wealth inequality as described in section 3.1.
All of the models imply a tight relationship between wealth and earnings. The correlation
between W and E is above 0:9, compared with 0:6 in the data. The retirement wealth gaps between
earnings rich and earnings poor households are too large. ￿s ranges from 0:14 to 0:16, compared
with 0:02 in the data. By contrast, wealth inequality within lifetime earnings deciles is too small.
The average Ginij coe¢ cient across E deciles ranges from 0:26 to 0:39, compared with 0:54 in the
data. In sum, life-cycle models with homogenous preferences imply too much wealth inequality
between earnings groups, but too little wealth inequality within them.
Intuition. The models imply low wealth inequality within earnings deciles because households
with identical lifetime earnings target the same retirement wealth. What prevents them from
attaining identical wealth is the timing of earnings shocks over the life-cycle (and inheritances).
However, long-lived households are able to smooth earnings shocks well and come reasonably close
to their target wealth levels. In part, positive and negative shocks average out over the life-cycle. In
addition, households distribute the e⁄ects of shocks that are received early in life over many years.
As a result, the model economies fail to generate the sizeable number of earnings rich households
with low retirement wealth observed in the data.
The models imply large wealth gaps between earnings deciles for several reasons. (i) Earnings
rich households save more to insure against longevity risk. (ii) Earnings rich households likely
received favorable earnings shocks. These are partly saves in order to smooth consumption. (iii)
For earnings rich households, retirement transfers replace a smaller fraction of their pre-retirement
incomes than for earnings poor households.
17Heterogeneous preferences. Discount rate heterogeneity introduces a source of wealth inequal-
ity that is orthogonal to lifetime earnings. This helps account for the large wealth dispersion among
observationally similar households observed in the PSID. It also reduces the correlation between
lifetime earnings and wealth. The correlation coe¢ cient CWE drops to values between 0:65 and
0:71, which is not too far from the empirical value of 0:6.
Wealth inequality within lifetime earnings deciles increases to levels quite close to the data.
Figure 3 compares the Ginij coe¢ cients of retirement wealth implied by the model economies with
the data. With homogeneous preferences, the models understate wealth inequality for nearly all
lifetime earnings deciles. With heterogeneous preferences, the models not only replicate the mean
of the Gini coe¢ cients, but also how the Gini coe¢ cients change between earnings rich and earnings
poor households. The models without altruism come particularly close to replicating the data.
Discount rate heterogeneity reduces the wealth gaps between lifetime earnings deciles, albeit not
enough. Earnings rich model households still hold too much retirement wealth relative to earnings
poor households. In the accidental bequest model, ￿s = 0:11 compared with only 0:02 in the
data. One reason is that earnings poor model households hold very little retirement wealth. These
households ￿nance consumption during retirement using transfer income. In part, this may be due
the simplifying assumption that retirement transfers do not depend on individual earnings.
Overall, the estimated degree of preference heterogeneity substantially improves the model￿ s
ability to account for the joint distribution of lifetime earnings and wealth. This is consistent with
the hypothesis that discount rate heterogeneity is an important factor underlying the observed age
pro￿le of wealth inequality.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of discount rate heterogeneity for understanding wealth inequality. A
key problem is how preference parameters can be estimated from consumption and wealth data.
The approach proposed here is to estimate the distribution of discount rates from the observed age
pro￿le of wealth inequality. Imposing the estimated distribution on a quantitative life-cycle model
yields an estimate of the contribution of discount rate heterogeneity to wealth inequality.
I ￿nd that discount rate heterogeneity increases wealth inequality. The Gini coe¢ cient of wealth
rises by around 0:07 to levels that are close to the data. The contribution towards accounting for
largest wealth holdings is modest. The share of wealth held by the richest 1% of households rises
by about 0:04, but this still falls more than 10 percentage points short of the data. These ￿ndings
are robust against changes in bequest motives and the intergenerational persistence of preferences.
Discount rate heterogeneity also helps account for the observed relationship between lifetime
earnings and retirement wealth, which poses a challenge for life-cycle models with homogeneous
preferences (Venti and Wise 2000; Hendricks 2004). In particular, the model with discount rate
heterogeneity comes close to matching wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime
earnings.
For computational reasons, the model studied in this paper abstracts from a number of poten-
tially interesting features. (i) Preference heterogeneity could interact with other sources of hetero-
geneity, such as access to risky assets (Guvenen 2005) or entrepreneurship. (ii) Preferences could
be correlated with permanent earnings. One reason, suggested by Knowles and Postlewaite (2003),
might be that patient households invest more in education. (iii) Preference parameters could vary
over time, as in models of habit formation (Diaz et al. 2003) or in models where households invest











































Figure 3: Gini coe¢ cient of wealth within lifetime earnings deciles. Experiment WA.
7 Appendix: Computational Algorithm
The algorithm searches over distributions of discount rates (!j) and lump-sum transfers (￿ ￿) to
minimize the loss function (9). The steps are as follows:
1. Start from a guess for the vector of model parameters ￿1 = (!j;￿ ￿).
2. For each guess ￿i:
(a) Solve the household problem. Denote the solution by ￿i.
(b) Holding ￿i ￿xed, search over (!j;￿ ￿) guesses until a minimum of the loss function is
found.13 In each iteration, compute the stationary equilibrium. The result is ￿i+1.
(c) Given ￿i+1 , resolve the household problem to ￿nd ￿i+1.
(d) If ￿i+1 is close to ￿i and if ￿i+1 is close to ￿i, exit the loop. Otherwise, return to the
next iteration to ￿nd ￿i+2 and ￿i+2.
13This step uses the Condor optimizer (http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~fvandenb/CONDORInBrief/CONDORInBrief.html)
193. To check that the algorithm converged to a global minimum: repeat the search for ￿ from a
perturbed starting point and check that the algorithm converges to the same solution.
The household problem is solved by iterating over the consumption function c(s) using a stan-
dard backward induction algorithm. In the altruism model, the computation starts from an arbi-
trary guess for the child￿ s consumption function, from which the marginal bequest value is com-
puted. The resulting parent￿ s c(s) is imposed as the child￿ s policy function in the next iteration.
The iterations continue until the parent￿ s and the child￿ s c(s) are su¢ ciently close. A 100 point
grid is used for the capital stock in the representation of c(s).
To solve for the stationary equilibrium, the algorithm iterates over guesses for the joint dis-
tribution of inheritances, discount rates, and age 1 labor endowments. Given the distribution of
households over states at age a, the distribution at age a + 1 is computed from the household￿ s
saving function together with the transition matrices Pj and Pe. All distributions are approxi-
mated on a grid of 1,000 capital stock values. The distribution of bequests is calculated from the
distribution of households over states and the mortality rates Ps (a) and used to update the guess
for the distribution of inheritances. The iterations continue until the changes in the inheritance
distribution are su¢ ciently small.
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